Arms Control Wonk

[Updates have been transposed to the end of the post. -Ed.]

Tal Inbar points out these photos from today’s military parade in Pyongyang.

More details after the jump.

Those are two three-stage missiles carried on large, eight-axle vehicles. YTN describes them as being about 18 m long and about 2 m in diameter. [Note: based on an examination of the photographs, the 2 m diameter figure does not appear to be accurate if the missile is 18 m long.]  That’s much smaller than the TD-2 — not bigger, as the Chosun Ilbo had claimed. (Really, who could imagine a mobile missile almost half the length of a football field?)

An earlier YTN broadcast, aired before the parade, called the new missile by the name KN-08. That report is summarized in English by AFP here.

Further reading: My article of last week at 38North.org on the unveiling of North Korea’s ICBM. Here at ACW, a discussion of the implications for missile defense — or, depending on your point of view, lack thereof.

Update | April 15, 10:19 am. An alert reader points out this CCTV broadcast. Going by the serial numbers, there were more than two ICBMs on parade. I see five: 904830216, 901010212, 904830218, 904830215, and 901010418. [See also below. -Ed.]

Update | April 15, 11:10 pm. Here are a couple more views of the new missile.

Update | April 17, 2012, 10:50 pm. Thanks to alert reader “AP,” who found a video of the entire parade as broadcast on Chinese television, we can see that six of the new missiles were displayed at the end of the parade. All appear in the shot simultaneously at 68:39.

Update | April 17, 2012, 11:59 pm. There’s been a fair amount of discussion in the comments of the source of the TEL. It’s pretty clearly a local hybrid built onto an extra-heavy chassis of the sort produced exclusively by the Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Co., Ltd., part of the China Sanjiang Space group, and a subsidiary of  the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), a state-owned enterprise. The most likely candidate appears to be Wanshan’s WS51200 chassis, which you can see in this nice illustration:

The CASIC website announced a sale worth 30 million yuan to an unnamed foreign customer in Oct. 2010. In August 2011, the Wanshan website announced a delivery of 122-ton WS51200s to an unnamed customer, dated May 17. “During the inspection of this delivery, the consumer was very satisfied with the vehicle and indicated the possible of the next cooperation.”

Thanks to all the commenters and lurkers who have unraveled this and other threads in this post.

Paul-Anton Krueger, who often seems intent on seizing the fallen mantle of Mark Hibbs, has advanced the story of Iran’s R&D activities at Parchin. His article in Saturday’s Sueddeutsche Zeitung – just in time for the talks in Istanbul — redeems this blogger’s foolish promise to post something about weaponization in Iran. It’s not an explosive story, but rather implosive: its subject is an alleged implosion test at Parchin in 2003, shortly before what’s believed to have been the suspension of Iran’s nuclear-weapons research. Whether and under what conditions the IAEA can visit the pertinent area at Parchin has been a subject of some dispute lately.

To make a long story short, Krueger reports that the research may have involved a neutron initiator. That’s a device that sparks a chain reaction in an implosion-type nuclear warhead. The subject isn’t completely new: the IAEA has reported on activities related to neutron initiators in Iran before. What’s new about this story is how it links three previously unconnected elements: implosion at Parchin, neutron initiation, and the assassination of nuclear scientists in the streets of Tehran.

Unfortunately for most of us, SZ appears only in German, and most of it never goes online. (You could always grab a copy during your next stopover in Munich, right?) In this case, there’s an abbreviated version of the story at the website. In German.

But guess what? You’re in luck. A translation of the complete article as it appears in the newspaper follows. Yeah. You’re welcome.

[start of translation]

Sueddeutsche Zeitung

April 14, 2012

Nuclear Grill-lighter

Iran has apparently tested a neutron initiator, an important component in a nuclear warhead

By Paul-Anton Krueger

Munich – A metal cylinder the size of a semi-trailer is expected to be the yardstick of Iran’s actual readiness to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the coming weeks. During visits to Tehran, IAEA’s chief inspector Herman Nackaerts has repeatedly insisted upon being allowed to examine the chamber, which was probably built in the year 2000 at the Parchin military base, 20 km [12 mi.] southeast of Tehran. The IAEA suspects that Iran conducted research there for the development of a nuclear warhead. An inspection would show the world that Iran is cooperating with the investigation into what the IAEA delicately calls the “possible military dimensions” of its nuclear program.

Diplomats posted to Vienna where the IAEA is headquartered said that Nackaerts selected Parchin because he thought it would be relatively easy for Tehran to grant his team access there. The inspectors avoid making requests based on information from intelligence services, which Iran often dismisses as forgeries, if the IAEA cannot share the original documents. They have their own sources, having interviewed Vyacheslav Danilenko, a scientist from the former Soviet nuclear weapons laboratory Chelyabinsk-70, who is said to have helped Iran to build the cylinder, a test chamber inside which it is possible to experiment with high explosives, as well as the ignition mechanisms of nuclear weapons.

So far, the government in Tehran has resisted the request. Formally, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA Ali Asgar Soltanieh has done so by insisting that Iran and the IAEA first establish modalities of inspection; in this connection, he has proposed a number of conditions that the inspectors find unacceptable.

However, there is apparently another explanation for Iran’s tough stance. Some diplomats, intelligence officials, and independent experts believe that Nackaerts has stirred up a hornet’s nest. They suspect that Iran used the cylinder to test a neutron initiator, a key component for a nuclear warhead. This experiment could have hardly any civil application. It would be difficult for the Islamic Republic to explain, since its Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has rejected nuclear weapons as “un-Islamic” and maintains that they are interested only in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

A neutron initiator can be compared to a grill-lighter: just as it kindles the fire in a pile of charcoal, neutrons initiate fission in a nuclear warhead. The resulting chain reaction releases tremendous energy – a flash of light, deadly heat, and a tremendous blast, as well as radiation. However, for the ignition to work, several processes must occur within a split second in the proper sequence. In an implosion warhead, an arrangement of explosives and other components compresses a spherical core of highly enriched uranium so much that the metal becomes liquid. The neutron initiator, which is embedded in the center of the core, is simultaneously activated by the immense pressure.

The IAEA stated in its report of November 2011 that it has received information indicating that Iran has worked on such a neutron initiator, and may have tested it – but without establishing a direct connection to Parchin or the metal cylinder. However, a person associated with a Western intelligence agency told Sueddeutsche Zeitung that the IAEA has been presented with “solid evidence” that Iran had conducted this type of secret experiment there. Another source from a different Western country stated, “That’s just what Nackaerts suspects.” The IAEA declined to comment and merely referred to their reports.

The experiment – or experiments – would have taken place in the year 2003 under the direction of two Iranian scientists who were the targets of simultaneous bomb attacks in Tehran on November 29, 2010. An assassin on a motorcycle fastened a bomb to the car of physics professor Majid Shahriari during the morning rush hour, killing him. His colleague Fereydun Abbasi-Davani narrowly escaped an assassination attempt perpetrated in the same way, escaping from his car with his wife; both sustained injuries in the explosion. Iran accused Israel and the United States of being behind the attacks. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appointed Abbasi-Davani as the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and as one of his own deputies in February 2011.

According to intelligence-service information, the two scientists were at Parchin as project managers partly responsible for developing a special array of neutron detectors and installing it outside of the test chamber. It was used during an experiment to see whether the neutron initiator worked, releasing sufficient particles. In addition, a flash x-ray camera was installed that would capture the implosion of the test system in the metal cylinder at very high resolution. The data from both sources combined allow an assessment of whether the ignition mechanism for a nuclear warhead would work.

According to intelligence sources, two other scientists whose identities are known to the IAEA assisted Shahriari and Abbassi-Davani. Mohammed Reza Sedighi Saber, allegedly an expert from the Ministry of Defense, was entrusted with the simulation and computer-assisted analysis of the experiment. According to this information, Ali-Reza Mola Heidar, an expert on instrumentation, contributed to the development of the flash x-ray system and the positioning of the neutron detectors.

Since the experiment took place about ten years ago, it is unclear whether IAEA inspectors would find anything at Parchin. The neutron initiator itself consists of a few grams of nuclear materials. Traces of it would still be detectable, provided that the cylinder is still inside the building and has not been thoroughly cleaned. Although IAEA Director-General Yukia Amano did not confirm reports about cleanup work at the military base, he spoke in this context about “information about activity that has taken place there.”

Diplomats consider the clarification of the incident at Parchin to be very important, because the development of the neutron initiator is one of three areas in which Iran is said to have continued research and development activities after 2003. At that time, according to the estimate of the U.S. intelligence community, the country suspended its program for the actual creation of nuclear weapons. An inspection at Parchin “would be a very nice confidence-building step,” one European diplomat said, referring to the nuclear talks this Saturday in Istanbul.

[end of translation]

For further reading: The IAEA’s November 2011 report, GOV/2011/65, which contains a lengthy annex on “possible military dimensions,” is here. ISIS has published repeatedly about the events at Parchin (see here, here, here, and here). According to Michael Adler at AOL, ISIS has a report in draft on the same subject as the article above. Jeffrey previously blogged about suspected neutron initiation experiments in Iran. Mark Fitzpatrick wrote about the diplomacy of Parchin at ForeignPolicy.com. I translated one of Paul’s previous stories about Iran.

Update | April 14, 9:46 pm. AFP reports that South Korean news channel YTN has described a series of four static engine tests earlier this year for what it calls North Korea’s KN-08 ICBM. Dong-a Ilbo reported on a static engine test late last year. Korean speakers can view the YTN video and read the transcript.

My article on North Korea’s emerging ICBM force is now online at 38North.org. (As always, these are my personal views only.) Go read it first. The bottom line is, we have bigger problems than the upcoming TD-2 launch.

It’s striking that Pyongyang, which presumably cannot afford to build a large fleet of intercontinental missiles, has opted to pursue the ICBM course in the face of the American missile defense deployment in Alaska and California (the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, or GMD). That decision implies some real confidence in North Korea’s countermeasure technology.

Creating effective countermeasures is not necessarily trivial; then again, it’s probably much less of a challenge than building the main components of a working ICBM in the first place. Just how much help the North Koreans received in this area in the 1990s from scientists and engineers at Russia’s Makeyev Design Bureau – the source of R-27 technology – remains unknown. However, the 2010 BMDR Report reported that “proliferators” were deploying countermeasures, and treated “the transfer of advanced capabilities” from other countries as a serious and ongoing problem.

One possible response to the appearance of the new North Korean ICBM, whenever it is finally deemed operational, will be to leave current missile defense deployments unchanged, on the grounds that they anticipated the new development. This stance would be consistent with the claims of two administrations that the GMD system is capable of defending America against the emerging threat.

Another approach – one urged by Rep. Michael Turner in recent HASC hearings – will be to add more interceptors. But if existing interceptors can’t beat the countermeasures, adding more units won’t help. Only if the North Koreans were try to overcome missile defense through sheer numbers of weapons, not though countermeasures, would there be grounds for a numerical strategy.

Against a limited but relatively sophisticated threat, quality counts much more than quantity. It’s risky to put too much faith in sheer numbers.

Now hear this.

If you haven’t already discovered Restricted Data, Alex Wellerstein’s steadily more remarkable blog on the history of (secrecy in) the nuclear age,* then you’re late to the party.

Sorry — nothing terribly clever to say at the moment. I’ll resist the temptation to highlight one or two items, as it would take me all evening to choose. Just go and read.

That is all.

* Mostly in America.

NB. The image above comes from one of Alex’s other websites.

A fun time was had by all yesterday morning at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, DC,  where I presented my research on AQ Khan and his fourth customer. (Well, perhaps there might have been a few stony faces out there.) George Perkovich moderated. I’m grateful for all of his compliments, starting with the invitation itself.

There was an overflow crowd. It was a rare treat to see a classroom’s worth of middies in attendance — plus, if my eyes did not deceive me, one or two cadets.

For those who couldn’t make it, the video is now online. The whole thing runs just under an hour and a half, including the Q&A. See if you can’t spot the cameo appearance by Pollack the Elder!

Update | Jan. 25. Global Security Newswire’s Rachel Oswald has covered the event. Some highlights on the policy front:

Any serious suspicions by other governments that New Delhi conducted nuclear weapons technology deals with the Khan ring could negatively impact India’s chances of concluding new atomic trade agreements with nations such as Japan and Australia or winning membership to the exclusive Nuclear Suppliers Group, [Pollack] asserted….

Indian purchases of nuclear weapons technology on the black market would not necessarily constitute a breach of any international commitments, Pollack said. New Delhi is not a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and is still in the midst of an effort to join several other arms control regimes.

India’s reputation as country that does not engage in nuclear proliferation has been central to its negotiation of civilian atomic cooperation pacts with foreign governments that would otherwise have balked at trading with a nuclear-armed state that has not signed the NPT accord.

Should Japan or Australia put credence in the suspicions that India was Khan’s fourth customer, it could make the two countries — both strong proponents of nuclear nonproliferation — think twice about signing atomic pacts with India, Pollack said at the Carnegie event.

Tokyo and New Delhi are presently in advance negotiations for a trade accord that would allow Japanese civilian atomic technology to be exported to India (see GSN, Oct, 31, 2011). A key obstacle to date to the conclusion of a trade deal has been Japanese nonproliferation concerns.

In December, Australia’s ruling party decided to permit uranium export negotiations with India, a controversial decision that ended a decades-long Labor Party policy. In making the case for the reversal, the Australian government compared India’s sterling nonproliferation reputation to that of Pakistan (see GSN, Dec. 6, 2011).

It would be difficult for Canberra to uphold that distinction should it conclude that India was on the other side of some Khan network transactions, Pollack said. “Maybe the Australians should rethink their rationale.”

New Delhi is also seeking entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an elite 46-nation export control organization that promotes nonproliferation standards for atomic trade by all members (see GSN, July 18, 2011).

“If India has plants full of stolen centrifuge technology that it is not acknowledging, then that’s embarrassing” for the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s reputation, Pollack said, adding that the organization wants candidate countries to be “like-minded.”

He said the Indian Atomic Energy Department could put to rest suspicions of improper dealings with the Khan network by providing “credible disclosures about the origins of the uranium enrichment technology, if they care to deny it that is.”

“That’s what I’d like to see — some sort of representation from the Indians,” Pollack continued.

For an explanation of what I mean about the Australian rationale for dealing with India’s nuclear program but not Pakistan’s, see Defense Minister Stephen Smith’s remarks of December 8, 2011. In particular:

Pakistan does not have the same record [as India] so far as proliferation is concerned. There have been serious expressions of concern about proliferation in the past.

Indeed. But there is now, at a minimum, a cloud over the idea that India’s proliferation record is impeccable (setting aside the matter of CIRUS, of course).

One reason that Japan ought to be concerned about India’s potential connection to the Khan network is A.Q. Khan’s record in Japan. For decades, a Japanese trading company played an important role in supplying his network by acting as a straw buyer. Ring magnets, maraging steel, machine tools, and other supplies from Japan flowed into the network. Where did they all end up? Are any in India? If I were in the Japanese government, I would be acutely curious.

When discussing India’s bid for NSG membership, what was in the back of my mind was the American “food for thought” memorandum circulated to NSG member states last May. As it says:

Our interest in permitting the full membership of countries that have demonstrated responsible nonproliferation and export control practices and the ability and willingness to contribute substantially to global nonproliferation objectives is already reflected in the factors for consideration. Specifically, we refer to:

– “Be supportive of international efforts towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles,” and

– “Have in force a legally-based domestic export control system which gives effect to the commitment to act in accordance with the [NSG] guidelines.”

[snip]

…The factors for consideration… that address a candidate’s obligation to have made a legally binding non-proliferation commitment, and have the ability to supply NSG-listed items stem from the group’s desire for “like-minded” partners. Given the exchange of highly sensitive technical data, commercial information, and frankness of the work of the NSG, the group wanted to ensure that the issue of participation in the NSG was focused on candidates that shared the same goals and commitments to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Food for thought, indeed.

Update | Jan. 26. A transcript of the event has become available.

Also, now that I’ve repaired the graphics in my slide presentation, you can view it here.

A few words about the pictures. Slide 31 shows just a label. But you can find the entire graphic in this ISIS report from 2008.

Slide 32 shows a table from this 2010 IPFM blog post. What I’d planned to say about it was roughly this: In recent years, Srikumar Banerjee, who was then the Director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and is now chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India (AECI), has made occasional remarks about the Indian centrifuge program. Based on these remarks, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, and MV Ramana of IPFM compared the pattern of India’s centrifuge development to that of Pakistan, which has been based on four different early URENCO designs.

This just goes to show you that my ideas about India as Khan’s fourth customer are perhaps neither quite so original nor quite so outré as some may imagine. On the other hand, it’s possible to read too much into Glaser et al.’s comparison. As I stated at this point during the presentation, India’s centrifuge program was indigenous in origin. Along the way, it appears to have incorporated foreign-origin design information and equipment. But it does not necessarily involve any exact copies of foreign centrifuge designs. Both the differences between the G-2 and the centrifuge design of ca. 2006 and the need to modify the UF6-resistant flow meters (see slide 23) suggest as much.

Lastly, I should provide credit for the nice image on the final slide, which I used as punctuation. This is a detail from the article illustration by Jeremy Enecio. It comes from his blog.

Update | Jan. 31. Carnegie has posted a nicely formatted transcript.

In a postscript of sorts to a recent debate in Australia over the supply of uranium to India, blogger and political scientist NAJ Taylor approvingly cites my recent article on the A.Q. Khan network and its fourth customer, and draws a rather strong conclusion:

In a large part, Pollack has assembled evidence that makes public what may already be known to investigators – although Pollack’s article was a public act which may prompt AQ Khan to be further, and more significantly, punished outside of the presidential amnesty which he was conditionally granted.

It also takes India’s involvement in the network to a level where – if it is to be believed – she must no longer be trusted.

Australia in particular, along with the United States and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, must review recent decisions to positively discriminate in order to permit nuclear dealings with India. This is because it would be unsatisfactory for India to have acquired its civilian and military nuclear capability through clandestine networks such as AQ Khan’s.

An yet even if there does remain some doubt, surely continued nuclear cooperation with a state that defiantly remains outside of the world’s peak nuclear nonproliferation instruments becomes untenable.

Read the whole thing.

Now, far be it from me to imagine that an article in a glossy magazine — an oh-so-not-safe-for-work glossy magazine! – could overturn India’s NSG exemption. (Cut to Jeffrey’s other imagined scenes.) But there is a moral to the story. When I set out to write, what I really had in mind was to tell a juicy detective story, full of psychological interest, which is why it appeared in Playboy and not in the Nonproliferation Review or the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, as good and important as they are. Yet there are, inescapably, serious implications to the illicit transfer of sensitive nuclear technology.

Next Monday, January 23rd, I’ll be giving a talk on the A.Q. Khan network and its fourth customer with George Perkovich at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, DC. Not only is this event an opportunity to present evidence that space constraints kept out of the final, published version of the article and to bring the story up to date, but it will turn the conversation to the policy side.

The details are here. Registration is already closed, but if you’d still like to attend, try asking the organizers nicely.

A Friend of Blog thoughtfully collected these specimens in Pyongyang last week:

They are, of course, postage stamps commemorating the “successful” delivery into orbit of North Korea’s two satellites, Kwangmyongsong-1 (1998) and Kwangmyongsong-2 (2009).

Maybe next time they should try the USPS. It could use the additional business, and the results couldn’t be any worse.

(Sorry to have been away from the blog for so long. You’ll be hearing more from me soon. I guarantee you that.)

If you somehow missed the Asan Plenum back in June, here’s your chance to catch an encore performance. Of one presentation, anyway. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies is holding a breakfast roundtable featuring yours truly with the University of Pittsburgh’s Dennis Gormley. The subject is — you guessed it! — the rise and fall of North Korean missile exports. And since there was no Gormley commentary in Seoul, the remake stands to improve on the original.

Details below the jump. Hope to see you there.

Tuesday, September 13, 2011
9:00 – 11:00 am
The George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs Lindner Family Commons
1957 E Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20052

North Korea has been one of the world’s most active suppliers of ballistic missile systems since the mid-1980s, but the nature of its missile export business has changed significantly during this period, moving from sales of complete missiles to sales of production equipment and components, and, finally, to collaborative missile development. Speakers will review the evolution of this important transition and its disturbing implications for international efforts to control missile proliferation.

Please RSVP to NonproliferationReview@gmail.com

A complimentary continental breakfast and copies of the July issue of The Nonproliferation Review will be available at the event.

Update | Sept. 15. Audio and video will be posted at the event page at the CNS website.

Late update | Oct. 1. Video of the entire event (Pollack, Gormley, Q&A) is now available at the CNS event page. Here’s just the first piece:

Since giving a presentation on North Korea’s missile trade last month in Seoul at the Asan Plenum, I’ve had a couple of requests to explain the data sources more precisely. Much of the curiosity stems from an article in the English-language online edition of the Chosun Ilbo that attributed the data to “a report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service.” Well, not exactly. Good luck finding any report like that.

OK, then. Here’s more than you ever wanted to know about where the numbers come from. Seriously, you’ve been warned.

For aficionados of CRS, the headline of this post has already given half the game away. Richard F. Grimmett’s annual reports, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations,” contain a heap of unique data on, well, what the title says. (The reports state that they contain “official, unclassified, background data from US government sources.”) And they’re my source for how many complete missile systems North Korea is known to have delivered abroad, to what regions, in what years.

(Prior to 1995, the reports were called “Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World.” Prior to 1991, they were called “Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier.” What’s in a name? That which we call a rose / By any other name would smell as sweet.)

Still, one thing the Grimmett reports won’t tell you is very much specifically about North Korea. Getting from Grimmett’s raw data to a reconstruction of North Korean missile deliveries took a heap of work, to use a technical term. The results appear as Table 1 in “Ballistic Trajectory: The Evolution of North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Market,” which appears in the current issue of the Nonproliferation Review. You can download it free of charge.

The best things in life are free, they always say.

A Peek Inside the Sausage Factory

Ballistic missiles appear in the Grimmett reports as “surface-to-surface” missiles, or SSMs. (It appears that this category has yet to capture any cruise missiles, which either count as anti-ship missiles or have been excluded by virtue of being air-launched.) The first step was to figure out which figures in this category could be attributed to North Korea. Of the six categories of arms sellers — U.S., Russia, China, Major West European, All Other European, and All Others — just three are recorded as delivering SSMs: Russia, China, and All Others. Based on an extensive, iron-rich diet of missile-related readings, I’ve concluded that the “All Others” SSM numbers for 1987 through 2009 correspond to North Korea. Why 1987? See especially Joe Bermudez’s paper from 1999 on the history of the North Korean missile program.

The second step was processing Grimmett’s numbers. Each report covers the prior eight years, and contains tables with two four-year bins for arms deliveries to each region of the globe, e.g., 2002-2005 and 2006-2009. The earliest available period involving a sane definition of SSMs (i.e., one that excludes anti-tank missiles!) is 1984-1987, which enables reconstruction of figures starting from 1984.

Naturally, each bin repeats four years after its initial appearance. For example, there’s a 1991-1994 bin in the 1995 report, and the same thing again in the 1999 report. The numbers in these repeated bins aren’t fully consistent, indicating retrospective updates in the underlying database. I resolved these inconsistencies in favor of the more recent reports.

The third step was to convert the four-year bins into annual data. This started with exercises in logic. For example, there were (about) 90 SSMs delivered from “All Others” to the Near East in 1992-1995, (about) 30 SSMs in 1993-1996, and zero in 1994-1997. It’s a straightforward inference that there were about 60 deliveries in 1992 (the difference between 90 and 30), about 30 deliveries in 1993, and none thereafter through 1997.

Unfortunately, the data contained a few irresolvable inconsistencies. After struggling with alternative interpretations, I opted for whatever reconstruction tended to favor more recent reports while minimizing the overall “error,” again on the assumption that retrospective updates were responsible for the apparent problem. The differences between interpretations are small in any case, and the inconsistencies were few to begin with. But reader beware: because of the retrospective-updating phenomenon, recent numbers should be considered provisional. As subsequent Grimmett reports appear, I might get around to revising the table. Watch this space.

The Soviet Scud Question

To get a fuller picture of the global missile market, I carried out these steps not only for North Korea but also Russia and China. All three appear in the paper in Table 1. The Soviet figures contain an oddity: a staggering 1,660 SSM deliveries to “Asia” from 1989 to 1991. These figures correspond to the appearance of Scud missiles on the battlefield in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of Soviet ground troops in 1988. Did the Soviets really export that many missiles over such a short period?

In the end, I discounted these numbers, a choice supported by reports that “all functions connected with the security, transportation, storage and launch of Scud missiles [in Afghanistan] are handled by Soviet advisers.” In other words, they weren’t exports at all, but were missiles operated abroad by Red Army troops. A book co-authored by a retired ISI Brigadier, Mohammed Yousaf, makes essentially the same claim.

How long that situation persisted is less clear. An article by Bermudez in the February 1992 issue of Jane’s Intelligence Review dated the arrival of the Scuds to October 1988, commenting that “there is little doubt that at this time that the ‘Scuds’ were under the direct operational control of the Soviets, who conducted all fire missions.” But it isn’t apparent whether unused missiles might have been left with the Afghan military after the abrupt withdrawal of the “advisers,” which Bermudez dates to November 1991. Regardless, this wasn’t the actual subject of the paper, so even including all 1,660 SSMs wouldn’t have changed any of its conclusions. Although it would interfere with claims like “40% of Missiles in Developing World Came from N.Korea.”

I’ll let Jeffrey tackle the question of whether any deliveries are missing from the China column.

On a Personal Note

Thanks to those who made it possible to do this research and to present it. Thanks also to the voters who picked my article as the winner of the first online reader survey at the Nonproliferation Review. However much other recent evidence might suggest otherwise, democracy clearly is the best system.

Update. See also “North Korea’s Shrinking Role in the Global Missile Market,” now live at 38North.org. It details recent interceptions of arms shipments from North Korea, discusses Burma’s apparent emergence as a new customer, and identifies new ballistic missile suppliers, actual or potential.

Late Update. “Missile control: A multi-decade experiment in nonproliferation,” is now live at TheBulletin.org. It builds on this research to uncover what has worked to stop missile proliferation, what hasn’t, and what lessons could be drawn from that for related challenges.

Another Update | Sept. 1, 2011. FAS has just posted a complete run of the Grimmett reports from 1982 through 2010. Now you can roll your own version of Table 1, if you like.

At one point in a wide-ranging op-ed back in March, Frank von Hippel made the case for a global switchover to multinational consortia for uranium enrichment:

[It] would make it more difficult for any one country to divert the material to military ends. In fact, Urenco, the West’s most successful uranium enrichment enterprise, is already under the joint ownership of Germany, the Netherlands and Britain.

The United States should help shape this industrial model into an international one, in which all enrichment plants are under multinational control. Doing so would make it more difficult for countries like Iran to justify building national enrichment plants that could be used to produce nuclear weapons materials.

The attractions of the proposal are clear enough, in principle – much broader access to state-of-the-art technology without the proliferation risks involved in national fuel cycles. But offering URENCO as an example of how to do it rings false.

Really, has there been a bigger disaster for nonproliferation? Brazil, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and probably others have been the unintended beneficiaries of URENCO centrifuge technology. Perhaps Dutch and German engineers needed their own ISTC years before it was established for the benefit of Russian scientists.

And lest you think it’s just a URENCO problem, consider where North Korea got its reprocessing technology: the defunct Eurochemic consortium based in Belgium. That seems less like a URENCO-style case of massive and recurring intellectual property theft, and more like a giveaway. According to Mark Hibbs in the Feb. 28, 1994 issue of NuclearFuel,

As early as 1970, in open IAEA publications and in so-called external technical reports (ETR), Eurochemic made public schematic blueprints for plant construction, flow charts for process engineering, and operations results. ‘There was no secret about this work,’ an official at KFK [the Nuclear Research Center at Karlsruhe] said.”

The multinational approach remains an attractive idea, on paper. But work remains to be done to establish why it has gone so wrong in the past, and what could be done to prevent similar episodes in the future.